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Participation and Crowd-Out in a Medicare Drug Benefit:
 
Simulation Estimates
 
Dennis G. Shea, Ph.D., Bruce C. Stuart, Ph.D., and Becky Briesacher, Ph.D. 
This article provides information on like­
ly participation in the Medicare prescription 
drug plan and expected crowd-out. We use a 
microsimulation model based on data from 
the MCBS to estimate the costs and benefits 
of a Medicare drug plan, including the ben­
efits from reductions in risk. The simulations 
are repeated using different combinations of 
benefits and subsidies. In addition, the simu­
lations explore the effects of different behav­
ioral parameters for moral hazard (the 
extent to which participants increase drug 
spending in response to reduced costs) and 
risk aversion (the extent to which partici­
pants would be willing to pay to avoid risk) 
to identify the impact of these factors on par­
ticipation and crowd-out. 
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous studies have examined the 
total costs of a Medicare prescription drug 
benefit, however, few have focused on the 
expected participation of beneficiaries 
under a voluntary plan or the extent that 
the new offering will crowd-out existing 
forms of coverage. This information is 
important for three reasons. First, identify­
ing who is likely to enroll in the Medicare 
drug plan provides important insights into 
who is likely to benefit and who is likely to 
be left behind. It is currently unclear how 
much a Medicare drug plan would assist 
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key groups with few current opportunities 
for coverage, such as beneficiaries living in 
rural areas, near-poor households, and 
those with significant chronic health prob­
lems. Second, understanding crowd-out is 
essential if the intention of the Medicare 
drug benefit is to increase overall insur­
ance coverage rather than merely replace 
private drug coverage. Concerns about the 
possibility that employers would drop pre­
scription drug coverage, evident in an early 
U.S. Congressional Budget Office assump­
tion that three-quarters of persons current­
ly covered by retiree health insurance pre­
scription drug plans would drop their 
plans, grew during policy discussions 
(Crippen, 2000). The final bill includes sub­
sidies to employers to maintain their pre­
scription drug coverage for retirees. 
Clearly, the cost of and participation in the 
Medicare drug plan will depend on the 
degree that existing forms of drug cover­
age are maintained. 
BACKGROUND 
Nearly all research into crowd-out exam­
ines the relationship between private health 
insurance and Medicaid eligibility expan­
sions for children and pregnant women. 
The work characterizing employer responses 
to the public program expansions is partic­
ularly relevant. Medicare drug benefit pro­
posals have provided incentives to prevent 
employers from reducing retiree drug cov­
erage, although that process is already 
underway (Stuart et al., 2003). Cutler and 
Gruber (1996b) found no evidence of 
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employers choosing to forego offering 
insurance benefits resulting from eligibility 
expansions. Rather, crowd-out resulted 
from enrollees’ dropping private coverage 
to take up public coverage. A more recent 
study assessed the effect of the Medicaid 
expansions on the offer decisions by small 
firms. Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller, and 
Jensen (2000) used a two-stage estimation 
technique to assess how the availability of 
Medicaid coverage affects the firm decision 
to offer health insurance to workers, plan 
generosity, and the take-up decision by 
workers who are offered health insurance 
benefits. They find that Medicaid eligibility 
expansions did not affect the insurance 
offer decision by small (up to 100 employ­
ees) firms. However, the authors do find 
evidence of crowd out occurring at the level 
of plan generosity. Finally, Dubay and 
Kenney (1997) highlight the important fact 
that crowd-out varies among the different 
subgroups of the population. They obtained 
crowd-out estimates of 27 percent for preg­
nant women with incomes between 100-133 
percent of the Federal poverty level (FPL), 
but estimates of 59 percent for pregnant 
women with incomes between 134-185 per­
cent of the FPL. These results suggest that 
crowd-out effects increase significantly 
with income. Rask and Rask (2000) also 
find evidence of crowd-out of private insur­
ance where the magnitude of crowd-out 
varies in relation to income level. 
Thus, research on Medicaid and crowd-
out suggests that some collapsing of the 
private insurance market is likely and that 
a primary source may be the response of 
individual Medicare beneficiaries, rather 
than their employers. Research also sug­
gests that crowd-out will vary among dif­
ferent population groups. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Our study differs from the previous 
Medicaid studies (Cutler and Gruber, 
1996a and 1996b; Shore-Sheppard et al., 
2000; Dubay and Kenney, 1997; Dubay, 
1999; Rask and Rask, 2000; Blumberg, 
Dubay, and Norton, 2000) since we are 
examining a policy not yet in effect, rather 
than analyzing one already in place. In this 
section we provide an overview of our 
model, followed by details on the simula­
tion of plan participation. The other com­
ponents of the model are then described. 
Model Overview 
The basic components of our model 
include a base case data set, a spending 
model, and a participation model. The base 
case data is a relatively simple inflation of 
data from the 1999 MCBS to the year 20041 
based on trends in income, population, and 
spending. The spending model estimates 
the impact of a given prescription drug 
plan on each individual’s drug spending. 
Those estimates depend on the features of 
the plan (e.g., deductibles, coinsurance) as 
well as behavioral assumptions about the 
impact of drug coverage on drug spending. 
The participation model estimates 
whether an individual decides to partici­
pate in a Medicare drug benefit. Those 
estimates depend on estimated out-of-pock­
et drug spending with and without the 
Medicare plan, estimated drug plan premi­
ums with and without the Medicare plan, 
estimated benefits from reduced drug 
costs risk, and assumptions of individual’s 
preferences for avoiding risk. 
1 Estimates for 2004 using the 1999 MCBS were the latest avail­
able data when this article was prepared. Preliminary compari­
son to 2006 estimates suggests main effects are similar. 
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Table 1
 
Decision Rules Used to Determine Whether Medicare Beneficiaries Choose to Take Up
 
Prescription Drug Benefit 

Base Case Coverage and Premium Enroll If Do Not Enroll If 
Full Premium Subsidy 
Any public coverage with or without private Base case third-party spending < Base case third-party spending > 
coverage( no premium for any coverage) Medicare [spending – premium] + risk Medicare [spending – premium] + risk 
Private plan(s) with no out-of-pocket premium premium 
premium 
Partial Premium Subsidy 
Any combination of plans with any out- Base case (third-party spending /2] < Base Case (third-party spending /2] > 
of-pocket premium payment (except sole Medicare [spending – premium] + risk Medicare [spending – premium] + risk 
coverage under a Medigap plan) premium premium 
No Premium Subsidy  
Medigap and no other public or public plan Medicare [spending – premium] + risk Medicare[spending – premium] + risk 
No prescription coverage premium > 0 premium < 0 
SOURCE: Shea, D.G., Pennsylvania State University, Stuart, B.C., and Briesacher, B., University of Maryland School of Pharmacy, 2004. 
Simulating Plan Participation 
Our guiding principal in projecting plan 
participation (or take up) is that beneficia­
ries who would fare better under the new 
drug plan will enroll, but those who would 
fare worse will not. We assume that benefi­
ciaries compare their well-being if they 
choose to enroll in a Medicare drug plan to 
their well-being if they choose not to enroll. 
These comparisons are summarized in 
Table 1, detailed by the beneficiary’s initial 
level of drug coverage.2 
We assume that beneficiaries compare 
the net value of their current coverage (if 
they have any) to the net value of the new 
Medicare coverage. The net value of any 
plan (existing coverage or a new Medicare 
plan) includes the drug expenditures paid 
on their behalf by the third party minus 
any policy premium for which they are 
responsible plus any benefit from risk 
reduction. The estimates of third-party 
payments come from the expenditure 
model and are described later. 
2 This comparison assumes that individuals have a reasonable 
ability to predict their future drug expenditures. That assump­
tion rests on research showing that past drug use among aged 
individuals predicts future use reliably once coverage has stabi­
lized (Stuart and Coulson, 1993; Coulson and Stuart, 1992; 
Stuart et al., 1991). 
Unfortunately, the MCBS only provides 
information on whether the beneficiary 
pays none, some, or all of the premium for 
their current drug coverage. To estimate 
existing premiums for persons who have 
prior drug coverage, we assigned benefi­
ciaries into three categories on the basis of 
current coverage: full subsidy, partial sub­
sidy, and no subsidy according to the 
source of coverage and whether the bene­
ficiary paid any premium. Source of cover­
age tells us where subsidy levels are 100 
percent, as in public programs, or zero per­
cent, as in Medigap plans, and where indi­
viduals have no coverage at all. Source of 
coverage is less telling with employer or 
HMO plans where the subsidy can vary 
from 0 to 100 percent. The distinction is 
important, as people receiving high premi­
um subsidies are more likely to keep their 
base case coverage than those with low 
premium subsidies. For these cases, we 
examined whether the person paid a pre­
mium. If they paid no premium and had 
coverage from an employer or HMO pre­
scription plan, we assigned them to the full 
premium subsidy category. If they paid any 
premium amount and had one of these 
sources of coverage, we assigned them to 
the partial subsidy category. In the absence 
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of any data on actual subsidy levels, we 
arbitrarily assumed that all persons in this 
category received a subsidy of 50 percent. 
The net benefit for an individual also 
depends on the premium for the Medicare 
drug plan. Since many Medicare prescrip­
tion benefit proposals include varying lev­
els of premium subsidy, we incorporate 
these subsidies into our participation 
model. 
To estimate the base premium for a 
Medicare prescription benefit we assume 
that community-rating rules apply and no 
applicant willing to pay the premium can 
be turned down. Under community rating, 
all enrollees pay the same price regardless 
of their risk-related characteristics. We 
compute the premium under the assump­
tion that the premium is set in an actuarial­
ly fair manner by private carriers with no 
Federal subsidy for adverse selection. We 
term these, risk-adjusted community rates. 
We estimate these rates using a recursive 
decision rule to find an equilibrium premi­
um, because the premium depends on who 
is in the pool and the premium determines 
whether the person decides to enroll. In 
brief, we first compute a premium estimate 
for the plan to be simulated based on the 
assumption that all Medicare Part B 
enrollees choose to enroll in the prescrip­
tion plan. We then offer the plan to the ben­
eficiaries at that premium and estimate par­
ticipation. After determining participation, 
we recompute the plan premium and offer 
the new plan and premium to beneficiaries. 
Once again, we estimate participation at 
the new premium. We continue this 
process until there are no changes in 
either the premium or the plan enrollment. 
This recursive model ensures the total pre­
miums sum to total spending in the 
Medicare plan. 
The last component of the participation 
model is the measure of the benefit from 
reduced risk, known as the risk premium. 
This depends on an assumption about indi­
vidual attitudes toward risk and estimates 
of the effects of different drug plans on the 
variance in drug spending. In most models, 
we assume a moderate level of risk aver­
sion among Medicare beneficiaries (risk 
aversion set at -0.0003). To test the effects 
of assumptions about risk aversion, we esti­
mate models holding constant the plan fea­
tures and vary the risk aversion parameter 
from -0.0002 to -0.0003 to -0.0004. 
Two variances are needed to compute 
the risk premium for each simulation, the 
variance of spending in the absence of 
Medicare drug coverage and the variance 
in spending in the presence of Medicare 
drug coverage. We estimate these vari­
ances by measuring the variance in drug 
spending for all persons by source of cov­
erage under the base case and under each 
simulated drug plan. The reduction in vari­
ance under the Medicare plan is multiplied 
by the risk-aversion factor and other para­
meters in the Pratt (1964) formula to iden­
tify the risk premium. In some instances, 
variance under the Medicare plan was 
approximately equal to or greater than vari­
ance under the base case. Risk premiums 
for these individuals were set equal to zero.  
To summarize, we estimate the net ben­
efit to each individual for their existing 
drug coverage and the Medicare plan. 
Those benefits are based on estimated 
third-party benefits, estimated premiums, 
and estimated risk reduction from the 
plans. If the benefits of enrolling in the 
Medicare drug plan exceed those of the 
existing coverage, the person enrolls in the 
Medicare plan and we adjust their spend­
ing with the spending model. If not, the 
person declines enrollment and their 
spending remains the same as estimated 
by the base case model. 
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Spending Model 
The spending model first determines 
whether the Medicare prescription drug 
plan being simulated represents better cov­
erage to beneficiaries than their current 
prescription plan (if they had one). Our 
definition of current coverage value is the 
effective coinsurance rate measured as the 
ratio of base case out-of-pocket prescrip­
tion expenditures to total prescription 
expenditures. If this effective coinsurance 
rate were greater than the rate in the sim­
ulated plan (meaning that the Medicare 
plan coverage is better than current cover­
age), we applied an insurance inducement 
factor to capture the effect of the new cov­
erage on individual drug spending levels. If 
the base case effective coinsurance was 
below the coinsurance rate of the Medicare 
drug plan being simulated, we reasoned 
that the new benefit would not reduce the 
beneficiary’s out-of-pocket obligation and 
no additional drug spending is induced. 
The next step of the spending model is 
to identify and apply the insurance induce­
ment effect. The primary challenge to all 
non-experimental efforts to estimate the 
impact of insurance on the demand for cov­
ered services is that individuals may select 
into (or out of) coverage because of unob­
servable characteristics related to their 
needs. We estimated three models to pro­
ject insurance inducement effects. The 
first is a naïve ordinary least squares 
regression of insurance duration (full and 
part year) and demographic factors on 
drug spending. We label it naïve because 
no attempt is made to control for selection 
effects. The second method is a standard 
two-stage selection bias-corrected regres­
sion. The third is a panel random effects 
model using 2 years of data from each indi­
vidual rather than just one as in the first 
two methods. The data for the panel model 
came from a previous study by the authors 
using 1995-1996 MCBS data (Stuart, Shea, 
and Briesacher, 2001). The individual ran­
dom effects and covariates control for mea­
sured and unmeasured differences among 
individuals that can impact spending, 
including that associated with selection. In 
all of these models, we find a statistically 
significant insurance inducement effect on 
prescription drug spending of relatively 
similar magnitude (approximately -0.5). 
We estimate a set of alternative simulations 
in which the elasticity is varied between ­
0.25, -0.5, and -0.75 to test the sensitivity of 
this assumption. 
To apply the insurance inducement fac­
tor under various cost-sharing provisions 
we begin with a preliminary estimate of 
induced prescription spending for each 
person based on the difference between 
the base case coinsurance rate and the one 
specified by the Medicare drug plan being 
simulated and the assumed inducement 
effect.  That preliminary estimate is then 
adjusted depending on additional plan fea­
tures such as deductibles, out-of-pocket 
maximums, and donut holes (gaps in cov­
erage above the deductible and coinsured 
areas and below the out-of-pocket maxi­
mum). 
For example, take a plan with coinsur­
ance of 50 percent, a $250 deductible, a 
$2,000 spending cap, and a $6,000 stop-loss 
for someone who has no existing (base 
case) coverage. Under this type of plan, the 
individual would face full costs for the first 
$250, 50 percent of the next $4,000 of 
spending, full costs of the next $3,750 
($6,000-$2,000-$250), and then none of the 
costs above $8,000 ($250+$4,000+$3,750). 
We first compute the level of spending 
that would be induced by this plan simply 
on the basis of the change in coinsurance 
(from 100 to 50 percent), giving us two lev­
els of spending for this individual: base 
case and preliminary induced. Individuals 
with induced spending below $250 face no 
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effective price reduction from the plan and 
we reset their final spending estimate 
equal to their base case spending. Persons 
whose preliminary induced spending 
exceeds $250, but below $4,250 face a 
lower marginal price of 50 percent, and we 
set their final spending equal to the prelim­
inary induced amount. For persons in the 
donut hole with preliminary induced 
spending and base case spending above 
$4,250, but below $8,000, we assume that 
they will perceive that their effective price 
will only be reduced on the first $4,250 of 
spending, so we adjust their preliminary 
estimate downward to get their final 
induced spending. Finally, persons with 
more than $8,000 in annual drug spending 
will face additional inducement for all pur­
chases above that level since these are 
obtained at a zero marginal price. An addi­
tional induced amount is added to their 
preliminary induced level of spending to 
create their final induced spending. 
To summarize for persons choosing to 
enroll in a Medicare drug plan, individual 
base case spending is increased based pri­
marily on the change in the percentage of 
drug costs they are estimated to bear. This 
amount is adjusted up or down, depending 
on whether the estimated increase in 
spending places them in a range where 
additional features of the drug plan will 
require them to bear a greater or lesser 
amount of the costs. For persons choosing 
not to enroll, spending remains at the base 
case level. 
Base Case Model and Additional 
Details 
Our data source is the 1999 MCBS, a 
nationally representative longitudinal 
panel survey of Medicare beneficiaries 
conducted by CMS which collects exten­
sive information on individuals’ use and 
expenditures for health services, health 
insurance, health and functional status, 
and sociodemographics (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2002). Our 
sample includes all community-residing 
respondents in the MCBS. We begin with a 
base case scenario created from projec­
tions of the 1999 MCBS data to CY 2004. 
The base case portrays prescription use 
and coverage in 2004 under current 
Medicare Program rules. Base case pro­
jections include changes in the Medicare 
population, beneficiary income and pover­
ty status, and inflation in prescription drug 
expenditures, as well as estimated under-
reporting of prescriptions in the MCBS. 
These figures are not adjusted for any 
changes in the private insurance market­
place between 1999 and 2004. 
The base case population includes com­
munity-dwelling Medicare beneficiaries 
with at least 1 month of enrollment in 
Medicare Part B. We exclude institutional­
ized beneficiaries because the MCBS does 
not capture their drug expenditures. These 
institutionalized beneficiaries comprise 
about 5 percent of the total Medicare pop­
ulation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
institutionalized beneficiaries have approx­
imately double the prescription expendi­
tures of community-dwelling beneficiaries. 
If so, our simulation represents approxi­
mately 90 percent of the total Medicare 
beneficiary drug spending. 
To project the beneficiary population, we 
inflated each person’s MCBS cross-sec­
tional weight by an inflation factor, which 
represents the projected overall growth in 
the Medicare population during the period 
(Moon, 2003). We inflate the reported 
MCBS income by the annualized rate of 
increase in median household income for 
householders age 65 or over between 1997 
and 1999 from the Current Population 
Survey. We followed the computations for 
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calculating the 2001 poverty guidelines to 
calculate estimated poverty guidelines for 
2004 (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2002). 
The base case scenario holds prescrip­
tion coverage rates constant at 1999 levels. 
Our prior analyses of prescription drug 
coverage (2000) shows a steady increase 
between 0.7 and 3.6 percent per year in the 
number of beneficiaries having prescrip­
tion drug coverage at some point during 
the year. Between 1997 and 2002 the num­
ber of Medicare beneficiaries with pre­
scription drug coverage in M+C plans 
declined (Laschober et al., 1999; Cassidy 
and Gold, 2000). This trend in combina­
tion with retrenchment in retiree health 
benefits in recent years suggests prescrip­
tion coverage of Medicare beneficiaries 
may have peaked in 1999. 
To get base case prescription drug 
spending, we inflate each individual’s 
spending with an inflation factor derived 
from two main components. First, an under-
reporting adjustment of 1.159 is applied to 
spending. A recent CMS study by Poisal 
(2001) suggested that prescription drug 
spending is underestimated by 15.9 percent 
in the MCBS. By contrast, the Actuarial 
Research Corporation (ARC) applied a 10­
percent underreporting adjustment (Fuchs 
et al., 2000) and the U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office applied a 25-percent adjust­
ment. The second component of the infla­
tion factor is derived from the national 
health expenditure actual and predicted 
levels for drug expenditures for the U.S. 
population from 1999 to 2004. 
RESULTS 
Table 2 illustrates the model’s projection 
of Medicare drug spending under the 
assumption of no additional prescription 
plan. According to the model, approxi­
mately one-fifth of the Medicare population 
Table 2
 
Projected Spending on Prescription Drugs, by
 
Medicare Beneficiaries: 2004
 
Spending Billion 
Total Spending on Prescription Drugs $91.1 
Medicare Spending 0.1 
Other Third-Party Spending 55.3 
Out-of-Pocket Spending 35.8 
NOTE: These projections are forecasted assuming there is no addi­
tional prescription plan. 
SOURCE: Shea, D.G., Pennsylvania State University, Stuart, B.C., and 
Briesacher, B., University of Maryland School of Pharmacy, 2004. 
would be without prescription drug cover­
age. Total spending would exceed $90 bil­
lion with almost 40 percent of that spend­
ing being made by beneficiaries in out-of­
pocket costs (that does not include pre­
scription drug premiums). 
We then simulate the addition of a 
Medicare prescription drug plan which has 
the following features: a $250 deductible; 
coinsurance of 50 percent for spending 
between $250 and $2,000; donut of 100 per­
cent coinsurance between $2,000 and 
$4,800; stop-loss at $4,800 (total spending, 
which would be $3,925 out-of-pocket); full 
subsidy for persons with income <150 per­
cent of the FPL; partial subsidy (linear 
decline) for persons between 150 and 175 
percent of FPL; no subsidy for persons 
above this level. 
Under this scenario, total prescription 
drug spending by the Medicare population 
increases by almost 11 percent to over 
$108 billion. Overall, participation in the 
Medicare plan is 41 percent. Figure 1 
shows how participation varies according 
to prior coverage of the enrollee. The fig­
ure indicates that with no subsidy offered 
to higher income participants, crowd-out of 
the usually generous employer and 
Medicare HMO plans would be small, with 
less than one-quarter of persons with those 
types of coverage switching from their 
existing coverage to the Medicare plan. On 
the other hand, even in the absence of a 
subsidy for persons with higher income, 
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Figure 1
 
Medicare Prescription Drug Plan Enrollment Rates, by Prior Drug Coverage: 2004
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SOURCE: Shea, D.G., Pennsylvania State University, Stuart, B.C., and Briesacher, B., University of 
Maryland School of Pharmacy, 2004. 
more than 60 percent of those with other 
private (often Medigap) coverage would 
join the Medicare drug plan. This level is 
nearly as high as the take-up rate for those 
with no prior coverage and reflects the 
more generous coverage in the Medicare 
plan and the associated risk-reduction ben­
efits to these persons. 
Figure 2 examines how changes in the 
assumptions about insurance inducement 
and risk aversion impact participation. The 
assumptions we make about risk aversion 
and insurance inducement have only a 
modest impact on participation. In the case 
when both risk aversion and insurance 
inducement are high (-0.0004 and -0.75, 
respectively) participation rates are less 
than 10 percentage points higher than in 
the case when both of these are low 
(-0.0002 and -0.25, respectively). Although 
changes in these factors shift the benefits 
individuals receive through third-party 
spending and risk reduction, they have lit­
tle impact at the margin. Plan features, 
such as the donut hole limit the impact of 
insurance inducement on plan participa­
tion, because once an individual reaches 
that level of spending, no additional third-
party payments are forthcoming until they 
reach the out-of-pocket maximum. Similarly, 
the generous coverage provided in employ­
er plans, where the plurality of beneficia­
ries receives coverage, means that even a 
comprehensive Medicare drug plan offers 
little additional risk-reduction benefit to 
these beneficiaries. 
Tables 3 and 4 show how participation is 
impacted by subsidy and benefit levels. 
Table 3 shows participation rates overall 
and by prior coverage under the assump­
tion of a low benefit plan. This low benefit 
plan has a $250 deductible, 50 percent coin­
surance, a $2,000 cap, and $6,000 stop loss. 
Table 4 shows participation rates for a 
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Figure 2
 
Effects of Inducement and Risk Aversion Assumptions On Participation in a Medicare
 
Prescription Drug Plan: 2004
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SOURCE: Shea, D.G., Pennsylvania State University, Stuart, B.C., and Briesacher, B., University of 
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Table 3 
Estimated Participation Rate in a Low Benefit Medicare Prescription Plan1, by Source of Current
 
Coverage Based on Alternative Premium Subsidies: 2004
 
Beneficiary Income 
</=135 Percent of FPL >135 Percent of FPL 
Premium Subsidy Percent 
Coverage 100 25 35 50 75 
Total 56.7 18.5 20.4 24.2 41.7 
Employer Sponsored 32.4 4.7 5.8 7.6 14.3 
Medigap 100.0 49.6 53.0 59.2 73.1 
Medicare HMO 49.6 5.9 7.0 9.9 17.8 
Medicaid 19.1 9.3 10.4 11.9 14.6 
Other Public 63.8 20.3 22.7 28.4 38.5 
Mixed Plans 41.3 13.8 14.9 17.8 26.6 
No Coverage 100.0 40.2 43.8 51.0 100.0 
1 This plan has a $250 deductible, 50-percent coinsurance, a $2,000 cap, and $6,000 stop loss. 
SOURCE: Shea, D.G., Pennsylvania State University, Stuart, B.C., and Briesacher, B., University of Maryland School of Pharmacy, 2004. 
moderate benefit package with no deduct- in our simulations than the behavioral 
ible, 50 percent coinsurance, a $2,500 cap, assumptions previously modeled. 
and $4,000 stop loss. Clearly, these features Participation rates among those with prior 
have more significant impacts on participation employer coverage are quite low until a sub-
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Table 4 
Estimated Participation Rate in a Moderate Benefit Medicare Prescription Plan1, by Source of
 
Current Coverage Based on Alternative Premium Subsidies: 2004
 
Beneficiary Income 
</=135 Percent of FPL >135 Percent of FPL 
Coverage 100 25 
Premium Subsidy Percent 
35 50 75 
Total 65.9 19.5 21.9 27 41.4
 
Employer Sponsored 52.6 6.4 7.5 9.9 21.6
 
Medigap 100 50.3 54.3 63.5 80.5
 
Medicare HMO 64.6 6.3 8 11.7 24
 
Medicaid 28.5 9.3 10.4 13 18.5
 
Other Public 74.3 22.2 24.7 32.2 51.2
 
Mixed Plans 58.8 15.6 16.9 22.3 36.9
 
No Coverage 100 39.9 45 53.6 72.7
 
1 This plan has no deductible, 50 percent coinsurance, a $2,500 cap, and $4,000 stop loss.
 
SOURCE: Shea, D.G., Pennsylvania State University, Stuart, B.C., and Briesacher, B., University of Maryland School of Pharmacy, 2004.
 
stantial premium subsidy of 75 percent is 
provided. This suggests that crowd-out of 
employer plans might be minimized through 
subsidies scaled with income levels. 
Participation rates are approximately 10-per­
cent higher among low-income beneficiaries 
and 1 to 3 percent higher among higher 
income beneficiaries under the more gener­
ous plan, with one exception. At a high sub­
sidy level, our simulations indicate that a low 
benefit plan may achieve participation rates 
that are higher. Participation clearly depends 
on both the potential benefit paid out as well 
as the risk premium perceived by the indi­
vidual and how those benefits compare to the 
actual premium costs. At a high subsidy 
level, the premium cost of the low benefit 
plan is actually reduced enough that persons 
with higher incomes, but no prior coverage 
have a risk premium that exceed the premi­
um cost. Thus, they all participate under the 
simulation scenario which increases the total 
participation of the high income group. 
Otherwise, the more generous drug plan 
achieves higher participation with larger sub­
sidies for high-income groups. 
Participation rates also vary by beneficiary 
characteristics other than prior coverage. 
Beneficiary characteristics are related to pre­
scription drug spending patterns. Benefici­
aries that have low spending might prefer 
plans that have low deductibles. Others might 
prefer a high deductible, if greater coinsur­
ance can be provided. Still others might be 
willing to accept greater first-dollar costs, if 
more catastrophic coverage can be provided 
through elimination of the donut hole or bet­
ter stop-loss protection. Table 5 provides 
some idea of how various beneficiary charac­
teristics are related to participation as bene­
fits change. This table shows base case par­
ticipation rates under one prescription drug 
plan, and then varies individual components 
of the plan to see their effect. Overall partici­
pation is closely related to sex, race, age, mar­
ital status, income, rural residence, and 
health status. With respect to age, participa­
tion rates show a U-shaped pattern, with high­
er levels among the disabled and the oldest-
old. Participation rates peak among those 
with incomes just above the FPL. 
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Table 5
 
Simulated Beneficiary Enrollment, by Demographic Characteristics: 2004
 
Variation from Base Case 
Deductible Deductible Coinsurance Cap Cap Stop Loss Stop Loss 
Characteristic Base Case1 0 $1,000 20 Percent $3,000 $1,000 $3,000 $6,000 
Percent 
Sex 
Male 38 43 30 65 40 37 40 36 
Female 48 52 38 57 51 47 50 44 
Race 
Black 42 48 34 62 44 41 44 40 
Hispanic 43 49 35 61 46 42 45 39 
White 44 49 35 60 45 41 46 41 
Other 32 36 27 70 34 31 33 30 
Age 
Under 45 Years 40 45 37 62 42 39 43 37 
45-64 Years 43 47 36 60 45 42 46 39 
65-69 Years 37 41 28 68 39 36 39 33 
70-74 Years 41 46 32 64 43 40 42 38 
75-79 Years 46 50 36 59 47 43 47 43 
80 Years or Over 53 58 43 59 55 50 55 50 
Marital Status 
Married 40 44 30 64 43 38 41 36 
Unmarried 49 53 40 56 51 46 50 45 
Income as a Ratio of FPL 
<100 56 63 48 61 58 54 59 53 
100-120 62 68 53 68 64 61 67 60 
120-135 63 70 53 69 65 61 68 61 
135-150 41 45 30 62 44 39 43 39 
150-175 38 42 29 66 39 36 39 35 
175-200 39 44 30 65 42 35 39 36 
>200 36 39 27 69 37 33 37 32 
Metro 
Metro 4 45 31 52 41 36 42 37 
Non-Metro 54 58 45 60 55 49 56 51 
Health Status 
Excellent 36 40 28 43 37 31 37 32 
Very Good 41 45 31 51 42 36 42 38 
Good 45 50 35 56 46 41 47 42 
Fair 49 54 40 60 50 45 51 46 
Poor 49 52 42 59 50 45 52 45 
Self-Reported Health Conditions 
Heart Disease 47 52 38 57 49 46 50 45 
Cancer 45 50 36 59 47 44 46 42 
Arthritis 45 50 36 59 47 43 47 42 
Lung Disease 46 50 37 59 47 43 49 43 
Psychiatric 42 47 35 58 43 41 44 38 
Alzheimer’s Disease 48 53 41 52 50 43 50 46 
Diabetes 46 51 36 58 48 42 48 43 
Hypertension 47 52 37 57 50 44 49 44 
Osteoporosis 51 55 42 54 52 50 53 47 
Stroke 50 54 40 54 52 48 52 46 
1 This plan has a $250 deductible, 50-percent coinsurance, a $2,000 cap, $4,000 stop loss, and a 75-percent subsidy. 
SOURCE: Shea, D.G., Pennsylvania State University, Stuart, B.C., and Briesacher, B., University of Maryland School of Pharmacy, 2004. 
Raising or lowering the deductible effect on those with low incomes than on 
changes participation rates by about 5 to 10 other groups. Lower coinsurance boosts 
percent for most demographic groups. participation dramatically for several 
Higher deductibles have a somewhat larger demographic groups. The stop loss and cap 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW/Winter 2003-2004/Volume 25, Number 2 57 
Table 6
 
Population Crowd-Out in a Medicare Prescription Drug Plan: 2004
 
Moderate Benefit Plan Low Benefit Plan 
Subsidy (Percent) 
Measure 25 50 75 25 50 75 
Percent 
Crowd-Out of Insured 18 21 25 15 17 20 
Crowd-Out of Enrolled 39 39 38 37 37 32 
Expansion of Uninsured 65 73 83 65 71 100 
Expansion of Enrolled 45 44 41 50 49 52 
SOURCE: Shea, D.G., Pennsylvania State University, Stuart, B.C., and Briesacher, B., University of Maryland School of Pharmacy, 2004. 
generally have smaller effects on participa­
tion because they affect fewer beneficiaries 
than the other features of cost sharing. 
The impact of participation in terms of 
crowd-out can be viewed in terms of enroll­
ment or insurance status (Table 6). The 
table shows the ratio of those enrolling in a 
Medicare prescription drug plan that had 
prior coverage over the total number of 
persons who had prior coverage. This 
reveals what percentage of the insured 
population was crowded-out of an existing 
plan into the new Medicare plan. The table 
also shows the ratio of those who had a 
prior plan and enrolled over the total num­
ber of enrolled, or how many of the 
enrolled population in a new Medicare 
drug plan were previously covered under 
another plan. The table further shows the 
ratio of new enrollees in a Medicare plan 
that had no prior coverage over the total 
number of persons who had no prior cov­
erage. In other words, this shows how 
effectively the plan reduces those with no 
drug coverage. Finally, it shows what per­
cent of the total enrollment in a Medicare 
prescription drug plan were previously 
uninsured for drugs. 
In general, these results suggest that 
crowd-out is relatively modest. Our simula­
tions suggest that 20 to 25 percent of per­
sons with prior coverage could drop that 
coverage and enroll in a Medicare pre­
scription drug plan. They would represent 
approximately one-third to two-fifths 
of all new enrollees in the drug plan. 
Approximately two-thirds or more of the 
uninsured would choose to be covered, 
reducing those without coverage to just a 
few million beneficiaries. About one-half of 
the total enrolled population would be per­
sons who previously had no coverage. 
Another important part of crowd-out 
relates to how spending among payers 
other than Medicare will change. Our sim­
ulation assumes that those who have prior 
coverage that is more extensive than 
Medicare will be able to wrap this coverage 
around the Medicare coverage. For benefi­
ciaries with multiple coverage, the simula­
tion assumes a proportionate reallocation 
of spending among the multiple payers 
after accounting for Medicare payment. 
Figure 3 shows how much spending 
would be reduced for various payers under 
a Medicare prescription drug plan. Our 
simulation suggests that Medicaid and pri­
vate (Medigap and other) plans would see 
the largest spending reductions. Employers 
and Medicare HMOs would see their 
spending reduced by about 40 percent. 
Despite the changes, private out-of-pocket 
spending is estimated to fall by only about 
20 percent. 
SUMMARY 
This model simulation aids our under­
standing of potential participation and 
crowd-out in a Medicare prescription drug 
plan. We examine the impacts of plan fea­
tures and subsidy levels as well as behavioral 
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Figure 3
 
Effect of Medicare Drug Benefit on Aggregate Spending, by Payers: 2004
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SOURCE: Shea, D.G., Pennsylvania State University, Stuart, B.C., and Briesacher, B., University of Maryland 
School of Pharmacy, 2004. 
parameters of inducement and risk aver­
sion. Under the benefit designs modeled 
changes in behavioral parameters do not 
lead to major changes in enrollment. The 
benefits and subsidies have significant 
effects on overall participation and the dis­
tribution of participation among different 
groups. Simulated drug benefits with low 
deductibles and high coinsurance limit 
selection, but also limit participation by 
high-income groups. Lower coinsurance or 
higher subsidy levels raise enrollment to 
40 percent or more in all groups. 
Increasing participation among higher-
income groups, however, may have conse­
quences for both the performance and the 
perception of the plan. On the one hand, 
high levels of participation will limit the 
problem of risk selection. On the other 
hand, if many of the enrolled beneficiaries 
are those who drop prior coverage (one­
third to two-fifths of the total in our simula­
tions), the equity of the new Medicare 
spending might be questioned. With many 
younger families struggling to provide 
health insurance for themselves, questions 
about whether Medicare benefits are pro­
viding for those who could, in fact, provide 
for themselves, can certainly be an issue as 
the benefit is implemented. While crowd-
out should not be the only measure of the 
impact of a drug plan, it can create negative 
perceptions of the public plan. 
In terms of dollars, spending levels by 
Medicaid, private plans, and employers fall 
by 40 percent or more, while out-of-pocket 
spending (excluding premiums) falls by 
about 20 percent in the simulations. Again, 
how these changes will be viewed by the 
public may matter as much or more so 
than their true policy significance. The per­
ception that the new Medicare drug plan 
may be bailing out employers or Medicare 
HMOs, rather than protecting beneficia­
ries is one that will be raised often between 
now and 2006. 
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To address these concerns, the final bill 
included provisions making Medicare the 
primary payer for beneficiaries dually eligi­
ble for Medicaid, coordinating Medicare 
coverage with State pharmaceutical assis­
tance programs, and subsidizing retiree 
prescription drug coverage provided by 
employers. All of these reflect concerns 
policymakers had about crowding out 
existing sources of prescription drug cov­
erage. While these provisions may help to 
limit crowd-out, they also have increased 
the complexity of implementing the legis­
lation. 
Simulations obviously have limitations in 
what they can and cannot reveal about pol­
icy and its effects. The actual plan benefits, 
subsidies, and other features that were 
passed and signed into law are inherently 
more complex than what can be easily sim­
ulated. Furthermore, assumptions we 
make in defining the parameters of the 
simulation certainly impact the results. 
Many of those assumptions can be rightly 
questioned. We try to provide an under­
standing of the impact of those assump­
tions by estimating multiple scenarios. 
Finally, our current simulations only esti­
mate an initial impact of a new Medicare 
prescription drug plan. The new Medicare 
prescription drug coverage will have far-
reaching, long-term impacts that are not 
captured by the simulation. 
In conclusion, the development of a pre­
scription drug plan for Medicare beneficia­
ries represents an important arena for 
learning more about the impact of incre­
mental policy change on the Medicare pop­
ulation. These simulations can help us 
understand the potential pitfalls to the suc­
cessful implementation of a Medicare drug 
benefit. 
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